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LIBEL AND SLANDER - IMPLIED REPRESENTATION THAT PLAINTIFF
CoNsENTED To WRITE HER LovE STORY As LIBEL PER SE - Plaintiff
brought an action for libel against defendant for publishing in its magazine a
story, which it represented as being written by plaintiff, purporting to relate indiscreet intimacies between plaintiff and a certain man. Defendant admitted
the false representation of authorship, but requested a directed verdict after
submitting in evidence testimony given by plaintiff in a prior law suit,1 in
which she was said to have admitted intimacies fully as capable of bringing her
into disrepute as were those published by defendant. On refusal by the court
to direct a verdict, defendant excepted and appealed on the ground that the

1

Karjavainen v. Buswell, 289 Mass. 419, 194 N. E. 295 (1935).
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RECENT DECISIONS

above evidence constituted a defense of truth to the charge. Held, that irrespective of the authenticity of the evidence, the court below did not err because
defendant's liability could be based solely on the false imputation to plaintiff
of a willingness to publish to the world a sensational account of her love affair.

Karjavainean v. McFadden Publications Inc., (Mass. 1940) 26 N. E. (2d)

538.
The requisite injury upon which a libel action may be based is generally
stated as the tendency of a false representation "to hurt the plaintiff in the
estimation of an important and respectable part of the community." 2 According
to this standard, the decision in the principal case does not seem unusual. It is
rather the novel treatment of the facts involved which is of interest here. Apparently, in no other case has the decision been based expressly on an imputation to
plaintiff, implied through a false representation of authorship, of a willingness
and consent to divulge intimacies in his or her private life. 8 Truth is generally
a complete defense to an action for libel, but in the principal case this defense
did not cover the false imputation of authorship. 4 It is to be noted also that here
the misrepresentation is libellous on its face and does not require extrinsic evidence to establish it, although this is required in some fact situations.5 Publication of a letter in an advertisement in which plaintiff was represented as expressing a willingness to submit a photograph to defendant as proof of the merit
of his product in restoring facial beauty after the ravages of smallpox was held 6
2
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185 at 190, 29 S. Ct. 554 (1908); FosterMilburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909); HARPER, ToRTS, §
243 (1933).
8 It is interesting to observe that others have realized the possibility of holding
a defendant liable because, by implication, he represented that plaintiff was willing and
consented to put himself on public exhibition. The following note relating to the
use of plaintiff's picture in an advertisement without her consent preceded the principal case by thirty years: "It could be contended with more than plausibility that the
publication of one's picture or name in connection with an advertisement constitutes an
implied representation that he or she has consented to such use of the picture or name.
This, if untrue, would be sufficient to constitute an element of libel. If this be sound,
plaintiff in an action for libel based upon such fact would be entitled to maintain an
action if he had alleged and proved that he had been held up to contempt, ridicule,
etc." 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991 at 997 (1910).
4 In a few states truth alone will not be a defense to a charge of libel unless accompanied by good faith and an absence of malice. In some states, this is provided by
statute or constitutional provision. Stanley v. Prince, II 8 Me. 360, 108 A. 3 28 ( 1919) ;
Briggs v. Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 46 So. 325 (1908). In one state this result has been
reached without statutory or constitutional prescription. Hutchins v. Page, 75 N. H.
215, 72 A. 689 (1909).
5
For example, in Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 39 Scot. L. R. 432 (1902), defendant innocently published a news item stating that plaintiffs had become parents
of a child when plaintiff~ had been married only one month. In Hughes v. Samuels
Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N. W. 589 (1916), defendant sent a card purporting to
be that of plaintiff, who was an undertaker, to an address where a person was lying
gravely ill.
6
Hart v. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, I 13 App. Div. 281, 98 N. Y.
s. 1000 (1906).
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libellous as exposing plaintiff to contempt and ridicule. There, however, the
consent of plaintiff was expressly stated and an additional ground for libel was
found in the publication of plaintiff's picture. Other cases involving a false imputation of authorship have been decided on the utter falsity of the facts contained
in the article, the tendency of which was to injure the professional reputation of
the plaintiff.7 In a case decided more recently by the Massachusetts court, involving an action for invasion of plaintiff's right of privacy, the court cites the principal case as illustrative of a situation where damages for libel have been given
on a state of facts which also constitute a cause of action in privacy.8 Damages
for invasion of the right of privacy were awarded for an unauthorized use of
plaintiff's photograph for advertising purposes as a result of which it was
"understood and believed among the people generally that she had for hire
permitted her picture to be taken and used as a public advertisement." 9 In an
older case damages were awarded on counts of libel and privacy for the publication of plaintiff's picture and the representation in an advertisement that plaintiff was insured with defendant.10 The decision in the principal case is apparently
prompted in part by a concern for the right of plaintiff not to have details of his
or her private life published to the world and hence the court is inclined to give
weight, at least subjectively, to considerations pertinent to an action for the
invasion of a right of privacy. Since the courts have been hesitant to evolve settled
rules for a determination of actions in privacy,11 and especially since the law of
privacy does not appear to have been expressly recognized in Massachusetts,1 2
the court would appear to be justified in utilizing the facts of the principal case
to predicate liability for a libellous publication.

7 D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N. Y. S. 200
(1913); Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N. Y. 250, 167 N. E. 432 (1929).
Conceivably, these cases might have been decided on the false representation of plaintiff's willingness to publish a low calibre article, for this is implicit in the imputation
of authorship.
8 "Modern cases have made it possible to reach certain indecent violations of
privacy by means of the law of libel on the theory that any writing is a libel that
discredits plaintiff in the mind of any considerable and respectable class in the community though no wrongdoing or bad character is imputed to him." Themo v. New
England Newspaper Co., (Mass. 1940) 27 N. E. (2d) 753 at 7549 Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918).
10 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1904).
11 For general discussions on the evolution of the law of privacy, see: Warren and
Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890); Green, "The
Right of Privacy," 27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932).
12 Themo v. New England Newspaper Co., (Mass. 1940) 27 N. E. (2d) 753 at
755.

